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ABSTRACT
The historic process of fertility decline was interrupted during the central
decades of the 20th century with an unexpected period of increasing fertility
that has been called the baby boom. Normally it is considered a phenomenon
exclusive to countries participating in the historic demographic transition.
A recent study suggests that a similar trend change in fertility may have also
taken place in a few developing nations at approximately the same time and
with similar characteristics to the fertility boom in the developed world. The
main goal of this paper is to examine the extent to which these trend changes
took place in Latin America and whether or not their characteristics were
similar to those holding in the developed world.
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RESUMEN
El proceso de la transición demográfica se vio interrumpido durante las
décadas centrales del siglo XX por un periodo de crecimiento inesperado de la
fecundidad que en los países desarrollados se ha denominado el baby boom.
Normalmente se ha considerado un fenómeno exclusivo de los países que
participaban en la transición demográfica. Un estudio reciente sugiere que
un cambio similar de tendencia en la fecundidad pudo haberse producido en
unos pocos países en desarrollo aproximadamente al mismo tiempo y con
características similares al boom de la fecundidad en el mundo desarrollado.
El propósito principal de este trabajo es plantear en qué medida la experi-
encia de la fecundidad y los ciclos de la fecundidad de Latinoamérica son
comparables a los de otras sociedades desarrolladas y otras sociedades en
vías de desarrollo durante ese mismo periodo histórico.
Palabras clave: baby boom, América Latina, fertilidad, ciclos de
fertilidad, educación
INTRODUCTION
In many developed nations, the historic process of demographic transi-
tion was interrupted during the central decades of the 20th century by a
period of unexpected fertility increase that has been called the baby boom.
During this period, reproduction dynamics shifted with an acceleration of
nuptiality coupled with more or less important increases in total fertility
leading to a generalised increase in yearly totals of births. The process itself
was diverse in timing and intensity, with substantial fertility increases in
some societies and very modest ones in others. In all cases, however, a true
trend reversal took place that brought decades of fertility decline to a halt.
While this period has been widely studied, the resulting literature deals
almost exclusively with the developed world (Romaniuk 1984; Byerly and
Rubin 1985; Chesnais 1992; Owram 1996; Macunovich 2002; Emeka 2006;
Russell 2006; Sardon 2006; van Bavel and Reher 2013; Requena and Salazar
2014; Sandström 2014; van Bavel 2014).
In a recent paper, Jan van Bavel and Reher (2013) returned to the theme
of the baby boom from a comparative perspective based on data for 24
developed nations and have identified considerable heterogeneity in the
experience of the baby boom among these nations. In many countries —
mostly those situated in the English-speaking, non-European world together
with nations from Northern Europe — the baby boom was very important,
characterised by significant and prolonged increases in fertility. In other
parts of Europe, the intensity of the baby boom was much lower, especially
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in nations of Southern and Eastern Europe where it ranged from modest to
inexistent. The increase in cohort fertility seen in many countries suggests
that the baby boom was far more than a matter of tempo and period.
A marriage boom also took place nearly everywhere as people married earlier
and more of them married than before. In some nations, marital fertility
rose as well, thus contributing significantly to the overall rise in fertility.
A common characteristic of the baby boom was an important reduction of
childlessness, likely associated at least in part to more widespread and
younger marriage patterns. The authors point to the fact that the incidence of
contraceptive miscalculations cannot be discounted as an important factor
in the boom, especially considering that efficient contraception was not
available before the 1960s (van Bavel and Reher 2013, pp. 275-279). This
notwithstanding, however, it is also possible that in the developed world
people may have aimed for and obtained larger families, much as increasing
marital fertility in many countries seems to suggest (van Bavel and Reher
2013, pp. 279-280).
In the developing world, relatively little is known about fertility before its
pronounced decline beginning in the 1960s and 1970s. Some years ago,
Dyson and Murphy (1985, 1986) published two seminal papers regarding
fertility swings in a small set of nations in the developing world. Using very
rudimentary indicators they found that there was indeed a period of high,
even increasing fertility during the 1950s, precisely when the baby boom was
underway in the developed world. Even though they did not take their
interpretation much further, the apparent simultaneity of fertility swings in
some developing nations was an important result and constitutes the point of
departure for the present paper. Beyond this, however, little is known of the
component parts of this trend change or even of its intensity. The persistent
neglect of a truly global perspective on fertility trends during the 20th century
is the result not only of the self-centered obsession of many scholars working
in and on the developed world, but also because there are little data available
that might afford an alternate vision of demographic trends in the developing
world before mid-century or later. This may not be the case everywhere and
for countries with good statistical systems and valid vital registration, it is
possible to probe the earlier period with useful results, often by means of
indirect estimation techniques (Pérez Brignoli 2010). These notwithstanding,
however, for much of the developing world reliable data are very difficult
to find.
A recent publication has launched a full-fledged assault on this dearth of
knowledge regarding the developing world at mid-century (Reher and
Requena 2014). In this paper, micro-census data were used to reconstruct
cohort fertility trends for a set of developed and developing countries (13 in
total). These census data contain estimates of the number of children ever
born (CEB) by the mother’s date of birth and can be used to track cohort
fertility patterns for women born after the start of the 20th century. These data
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cover the period just prior to the boom, during the fertility boom and the
beginnings of the ensuing baby bust as well, thus offering a portrayal of
fertility for women bearing their children between ∼1925 and 1975. The
results of this study suggest that in the countries from the developing world
included in the sample there was an upward swing in fertility for women
born between about 1925 and 1945 who were having their children at about
the same time as baby boom participants in the West. This fertility cycle was
characterised by decreasing levels of childlessness, decreasing variability of
individual fertility outcomes at a national level and an important though
partially surprising role of education for fertility. Finally, the authors show
that in the developing countries used in their analysis, the role of mortality
looms large because the rapid improvements of survivorship tended to
augment the impact of increases in fertility experienced by these boom
cohorts. The authors hesitate to call the observed patterns a «baby boom»,
but underscore the commonality of fertility shifts in both the developed and
the developing world.
The original Reher and Requena study makes use of data from eight
nations from the developed world with another five taken from the devel-
oping world (Morocco, China, Turkey, Costa Rica and Mexico). Despite this
small sample size, the paper has high impact results for many parts of the
world. The goal of the current paper is to apply a number of the methods
used in the original study to a much larger set of data from Latin America.
Are the results in the original paper applicable to the entire continent? More
specifically, to what extent are fertility cycles in the region similar to those
holding both in the developed and the developing world included in the
original study? These are unquestionably pertinent questions because in the
developing world very little research has been carried out on fertility prior to
the period of massive fertility decline starting in the 1960s and 1970s. Despite
this, some experts on Latin American fertility transitions have already noted
an increase in total period fertility rates in several countries prior to the
historic fertility decline1.
In this study, a total of ten Latin American nations are used. Two of them
(Argentina and Uruguay) are not, strictly speaking, developing nations, but
the rest certainly are. After careful vetting, countries were selected for ana-
lysis based on the reliability of their census data. The detailed description
of reproductive changes in the region presented here is based entirely on
retrospective fertility data for cohorts of women born during the first half of
the 20th century. These results offer a complementary approach to the more
common use of vital statistics to reconstruct fertility cycles during this period
that, at least in some countries, is possible as shown in publications by
1 «In many cases, whatever a country’s initial TFR level was, in the 1950s and 1960s, before the
fertility decline began, there was an increase in this measure» (Guzmán et al. 1996). See also Pérez
Brignoli (2010).
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Héctor Pérez Brignoli (2010) for Costa Rica and María Eugenia Zavala de
Cosío (1993). Since an important part of the mid-century fertility boom
cannot be attributed exclusively to period effects, these fertility shifts, if they
exist, should also appear in the type of data used here. Cohort fertility esti-
mates, unlike other synthetic measures, have the advantage of reflecting the
actual reproductive experience of real women.
DATA
Research for this paper is based on the census data contained in the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, International (Minnesota Population
Centre 2011; hereafter, IPUMS-I). To date, this massive database contains
individual census returns for 258 censuses corresponding to 79 countries and
containing information on 560 million persons. While population censuses
are not designed specifically to measure fertility, using them for fertility
studies is not only possible but also at times highly profitable. Of particular
interest on this point is the possibility of using a single census to assess
fertility trends in the past, across different birth cohorts (David y Sanderson
1990). Any given census refers to a specific moment in time and all data
contained therein refer to that moment when the census was undertaken.
Despite this, it is also clear that the data referring to the number of children
enables us to make use of a cohort perspective, as long as we use only women
who have completed their fertile period2. In this way, cohort fertility can
estimated over time for all birth cohorts for women above that age, as long as
mortality and migration do not have significant selective effects on the fer-
tility of these cohorts. Besides technical detailed information about sample
design, characteristics, variables and variance estimates for each census,
IPUMS-I includes information about the comparability of the variable
«children ever born». Taking into account the technical characteristics of the
different censuses, the comparison among cohorts and countries is perfectly
feasible. Thus, these data enable us to reconstruct certain key indicators of
reproduction for women born during the first half of the 20th century in
several Latin American nations.
Initially we identified countries with censuses that had the variable
of CEB in IPUMS-I. In the selected countries, data quality is a source of
concern, especially considering potential problems of census coverage,
generally low levels of education among elderly women, the tendency of
informants to misreport data increasingly with age, or the possibility that
inaccurately reporting childlessness might increase with age as was found
many years ago by El-Badry (1961) and subsequently by Feeney (1995).
2 As a general rule, a sub-sample of women older than forty was chosen even at the risk of
slightly underestimating the final fertility of these younger women. This choice, which enables us to
follow fertility of more recent cohorts, does not affect the core argument of this paper.
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If these problems are widespread, they could alter the results regarding
fertility trends by birth cohort presented here, especially for the earlier
cohorts born in 1910-1935.
In order to ascertain data quality, three different tests were used. (1) One
was based on levels of non-response to the question about CEB. All cohorts
with levels of non-response 5+ per cent were excluded from our sample3.
(2) Where possible, results from different censuses were compared with
TABLE 1
Selected IPUMS-I samples and countries (test for data quality)
Tests for data quality
Country Census date
CEB
non-response WFS WPP Data used
Argentina 2001 Yes Yes Yes
Bolivia 2001 Yes Yes Yes
Brazil 2000 Yes Yes Yes
Chile 1992 Yes Yes Yes1
Chile 2002 Yes Yes No
Colombia 1993 No Yes/No2 No No
Colombia 2005 Yes No No No
Costa Rica 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dominican R. 1981 No Yes Yes No
Dominican R. 2002 No Yes Yes No
Ecuador 1990 No No No No
Ecuador 2001 No No No No
El Salvador 1992 Yes No No
Mexico 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nicaragua 1995 Yes Yes Yes
Panama 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Peru 1993 No No No No
Uruguay 1996 Yes Yes Yes
Venezuela 2001 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: CEB: children ever born; WFS: World Fertility Survey; WPP: World Population Prospects.
1Better fit to WPP data and lower levels of no response than Chile 2002.
2Yes for the 1931-1935 birth cohort; No for the 1926-1930 birth cohort.
3 In Latin American censuses, there is no indication that the quality of response to CEB
decreases significantly with age. In one study, just the opposite has been shown to happen (see
García et al. 2013).
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those derived from the World Fertility Survey (WFS) for the same cohorts.
Only countries where the CEB estimates fell within the 95 per cent
confidence intervals of those derived from the WFS were retained for this
analysis. (3) CEB levels were compared with estimates of total period fertility
rates ∼25-30 years after the birth cohort derived from the United Nations
World Population Prospects Database. For evident reasons, the resulting
figures were never the same because they refer to different indicators4.
The rule of thumb used here has been to include only cohorts and
countries that have passed all three tests. The exception is where WFS data
are missing. In these cases, if the other two tests were passed, the country
census was also included. In the case of Chile, the 1992 census was preferred
because the fit on the other two tests was better than that of the 2002 census.
The results of these tests are summarised in Table 1. In addition, in line
with Feeney (1995), we checked to see whether the trends in CEB for specific
birth cohorts shown by different censuses were similar, as they were in all
countries selected for analysis (Table 2).
The analysis is mainly based in two standard cohort fertility measures:
total cohort fertility rates and parity progression ratios. Provided all the
relevant information is available, these indicators can be estimated directly
from the census variable «children ever born». For each country, the two
fertility measures have been estimated for 5-year birth cohorts of women
born in the first half of 20th century (in the cases of the countries with
TABLE 2
Countries and samples selected for the analysis
Country Census date Sample fraction N
Argentina 2001 10.0% 3,626,103
Bolivia 2001 10.0% 827,692
Brazil 2000 6.0% 10,136,022
Chile 1992 10.0% 1,335,055
Costa Rica 2000 10.0% 381,500
Mexico 2000 10.6% 10,099.182
Nicaragua 1995 10.0% 435,728
Panama 2000 10.0% 284,081
Uruguay 1996 10.0% 315,920
Venezuela 2001 10.0% 2.306,489
Total 29,747,772
Source: IPUMS-I.
4 For a more detailed description of this battery of tests, see Reher and Requena (2014).
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censuses taken after 2000, the analysis can be extend to women born up to
the early 1960s). In all countries, women’s educational status has also been
taken into consideration.
RESULTS
Cohort fertility
The results from the analysis of these data offer convincing proof that in
the majority of Latin America the central decades of the 20th century are ones
of increasing fertility. Figure 1 contains the basic estimates of CEB for birth
cohorts of women born during the first half of the century in selected Latin
American nations. With the exception of three nations (Brazil, Argentina and
Uruguay), there was a significant increase in fertility for women born
between ∼1910 and 1935. The highest levels of fertility correspond to cohorts
born during the 1930s though in some cases (Chile, Costa Rica) peak levels of
fertility are visible slightly earlier (1925-1929)5. The dissonant results here
are shown by Argentina and Uruguay where fertility levels are much lower
than in other nations and there is no indication whatsoever of any increases
in fertility born during the period. Brazil, on the other hand, with much
higher fertility, shows no increase at all. Again with exceptions, cohorts born
during the 1940s initiate a precipitous decline in fertility that persists among
cohorts born in the 1950s. It is the unmistakable sign of a demographic
revolution (called the demographic transition) under way, though our data
only enable us to catch a glimpse of the initial stages of this enormous
process of change. Taken as a whole, the portrait that emerges from this
figure is one of a complete fertility cycle, with low levels at the outset and low
levels after 1940-1950, and high levels in between. In terms of birth cohorts,
it is a cycle that lasts about 50 years. Finally, the results of this figure show
very large fertility disparities prior to the demographic transition ranging
from more than seven children in Nicaragua to just above four in Chile, not
counting the very low levels observed in Argentina and Uruguay.
Despite important disparities, the results from this Figure point to the
existence of a common pattern in most of the continent similar in many ways
to that holding in other parts of the world. This is clearest in developed
nations where period indicators point to the existence of a similar pattern of
change: low fertility in the 1930s, relatively high fertility starting after World
War II and lasting into the 1960s or, in some cases, 1970s, followed by sharp
fertility decline thereafter (van Bavel and Reher 2013; Reher 2014). In some
developed countries, this pattern has also been seen with cohort indicators
5 Due to our quality control process, Bolivia shows only a very modest increase in fertility
because cohorts born before 1925 were not included. Had they been used in this paper the full cycle
of boom and bust would have been perfectly visible in Bolivia.
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(van Bavel and Reher 2013 and Frejka and Calot 2001a, 2001b). It mirrors
the results recently published for a small set of developing nations (Reher
and Requena 2014) and dovetails nicely with those presented 30 years ago by
Dyson and Murphy (1985, 1986) based on rudimentary period data. These
cohort data are also coherent with the period estimates of fertility presented
by experts on Latin American demographic transitions (Guzmán et al. 1996;
Schkolnik 2004). If we approximate cohort with period fertility, the simul-
taneity of the trend changes shown here is uncanny.
The increases in fertility during the boom varies widely, ranging from
increases of more than 20 per cent in Costa Rica and Panama, followed by
Nicaragua (14.8 per cent), Venezuela (12.5 per cent), Mexico (11.4 per cent)
and Chile (9.8 per cent). It is impossible to estimate this correctly for Bolivia
due to the very late starting date of the data set, and there is no increase at all
in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. These levels do not differ appreciably from
those holding in some developed nations such as France, Austria or Germany
for the same birth cohorts (Table 3).
Micro census data make estimating parity progression ratios a relatively
straightforward matter. These ratios are essential building blocks for
understanding the fertility histories of women of different ages present on
the census. The ratios show the likelihood that women of any given parity
FIGURE 1
CHILDREN EVER BORN BY BIRTH COHORT, SELECTED COUNTRIES
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Source: IPUMS-I.
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TABLE 3
The fertility boom in Latin America
Lowest CEB Highest CEB Differences
Country CEB Cohort CEB Cohort
Number of
cohorts
involved Absolute Relative
Argentina 2.68 1920-1924 2.95 1905-1909 4 −0.27 −9.3%
Bolivia 6.15 1925-1929 6.29 1935-1939 3 0.14 2.3%
Brazil 5.39 1910-1914 5.41 1920-1924 3 0.02 0.4%
Chile 4.19 1910-1914 4.60 1925-1929 4 0.41 9.8%
Costa Rica 5.36 1905-1909 6.48 1925-1929 5 1.12 20.8%
Mexico 6.00 1905-1909 6.68 1930-1934 6 0.68 11.4%
Nicaragua 6.27 1915-1919 7.19 1935-1939 5 0.92 14.8%
Panama 4.58 1910-1914 5.50 1925-1929 4 0.92 20.0%
Uruguay 2.45 1920-1924 2.63 1910-1914 3 −0.18 −6.8%
Venezuela 5.28 1915-1919 5.95 1930-1934 4 0.66 12.5%
Note: CEB: children above born.
Source: IPUMS-I.
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will go on to have another birth6. In order to simplify the presentation of
results, we have generated figures for different parities (0→ 1, 1→2, 2→ 3
and 3→ 4) in the form of panels for Figure 2. Very little is known about the
way these parity-based decisions change during the period of rising fertility
even in developed countries. What is apparent is that in the developed world,
there are indications of increases in these ratios for the initial parities (0→ 1
and 1→2) but mixed results at higher parities, with increases clearest in
countries with important baby booms (Reher and Requena 2014). Next to
nothing is known of what actually happened in the developing world, with
the exception of the few countries included in the Reher and Requena paper.
Data in Figure 2 show convincingly that the declines in childlessness were
widespread during the period of increasing fertility at mid-century. For the
Latin American nations presented here, the increases in this indicator are
quite pronounced, often by as much as 10 per cent. Judging from the results
FIGURE 2
PARITY PROGRESSION RATIOS BY PARITY AND COHORT
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6 Parity progression ratio is defined as the proportion of women of a given parity (i.e. the
number of children that a women has already had) who go on to have another child.
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presented here together with those contained in the Reher and Requena
(2014) paper, there appear to be indications that this may be a universal
characteristic of the mid-century fertility boom. There are three possible
explanations for this change. The most important one is the revolution in
maternal and child health taking place in which intrauterine deaths and
stillbirths were declining due to improved public health measures and,
equally as important, improved health and nutritional status of mothers. It is
interesting to note that in most countries included in our sample child-
lessness continues to decline even after the high fertility period is over, thus
suggesting the ongoing importance of health and nutrition improvements.
Second, in the developed world there is also a pronounced change in
nuptiality as it becomes more widespread and earlier during the baby boom
(van Bavel and Reher 2013). This argument is also applicable, at least to a
certain extent, to Latin America though less so to societies in other parts of
the developing world where nuptiality tends to be almost universal and is
always very early. There are indications of accelerating nuptiality during this
period in Latin America, though this effect is often muted due to the parti-
cular types of families and family formation that characterise much of
the continent7. Finally, decreasing childlessness may also reflect conscious
decisions to have families for women (couples) who did not want them
earlier; in this case, socio-economic circumstances facilitating the formation
of new family units may have also played a role. While it is impossible to
verify this last explanation with the results presented here, it should not be
discounted as a possible factor.
In this sample of Latin American nations, the likelihood of having a
second child increased in most countries for cohorts born in the 1920s and
1930s but then declined substantially for later cohorts as a result of incipient
fertility control in these populations. At higher parities, developing nations
show the pathway of the demographic transition clearly. For the earlier birth
cohorts, there is little indication of reductions over time or by parity in the
likelihood of having an additional child. They give every appearance of still
being immersed in natural fertility regimes. During the fertility boom,
however, there is widespread evidence that the likelihood of having a third or
a fourth birth increased in most nations. These increases are not substantial,
mostly because the starting levels are already very high, but they do exist.
Only in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil are there indications that this was not
the case. In other countries, women (couples) appear to have been seeking
larger completed family sizes during this period. After the 1940 birth cohort,
these ratios decline, often with striking speed, as parity-specific fertility
began to make inroads in the region.
7 Specific marital fertility measures estimated from censuses databases could prove to be
relatively uninformative, even confusing, because of the widespread practice of consensual unions
in several Latin American countries (Esteve et al. 2010).
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These patterns of childbearing can be seen from a slightly different per-
spective if women are classified by final parity and birth cohort (Figure 3).
Again the decline in childlessness is apparent. Equally eloquent is the
importance of large families (4+) throughout the period with evident
increases taking place during the fertility boom. This trend is also visible
among multiparous women during the boom in other countries and appears
to be mostly unrelated to reductions in childlessness, thus suggesting that
women were seeking and obtaining larger families during this 20-year fer-
tility boom in Latin America. Once the boom past, it is also clear that Latin
America was well on its way to clustering around an ideal family size of two
offspring though this process was still far from complete for the birth cohorts
used in this study.
Beyond the diversity of parity progression ratios and final parities, our
data also show a steady decrease in the coefficient of variation of cohort
fertility during the fertility boom in all of the Latin American nations
included in our sample (Figure 4)8. These results show that the variance of
family size decreased everywhere during this period of increasing fertility,
FIGURE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF FINAL PARITY BY BIRTH COHORT
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8 Figure 4 contains the coefficient of variation for estimates of countries included in this
sample.
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indicating, at least indirectly, that there were increasingly common goals of
couples during the period. Once the boom has past, however, the common
trend disappears. In countries like Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Costa Rica, the march towards uniformity continues unabated, while in
other countries the trend towards a reduction in variance ceases though
overall levels hardly increase.
We believe these differences are related to the progress of the demo-
graphic transition in the region. In countries when it had already begun in
earnest during or before the fertility boom, coefficients of variation continue
their unabated decline, while in others where it was only in its initial stage,
the passing of the boom period marks a halt to the process of uniformity. It is
likely that in the period immediately following the one analysed in this paper,
declines continued in those countries as the process of fertility control picked
up speed. In sum, this declining variance appears related to the growing
concentration of final-parity distributions of those women, thus pointing to a
greater uniformity in reproductive behaviour everywhere. It suggests that the
fertility boom that affected women born in the 1930s was not the result of
extremely high fertility in a segment of women but rather something that was
FIGURE 4
COEFFICIENT OF VARIATION OF CHILDREN ABOVE BIRTH (CEB) BY BIRTH
COHORT
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the result of an increasing standardisation of reproduction. These behaviour
patterns mirror those observed in the developed world closely, though final
parities there are much lower (Reher and Requena 2014).
Education and fertility
Improvements in education are considered a source of social moder-
nisation mainly because of the way education influences behaviour,
decreasing the willingness of people to accept their situation as one that is
difficult or even impossible to change. We know much more about education
throughout history in the developed than in the developing world, though
it is unquestionable that everywhere great strides were made towards
increasing the educational levels of national populations. The presence on
censuses of questions about education enables us to delve into how educa-
tion changed over the period and how this affected reproductive behaviour.
The starting point in this discussion is the spectacular increases in education
taking place in Latin America over the period under study. These should be
viewed together with processes of social modernisation and economic
growth as an indication that a major process of social change was under way
in the countries of Latin America during this period. Figure 5, which reflects
this process from a continent-wide perspective, gives fitting testimony to this
change. For cohorts born during the first years of the century, educational
attainment was extremely low, with ∼70 per cent of adult women having less
than primary education, often illiterate9. About one-fifth of the female
population had completed primary school, about 8 per cent secondary school
and almost nobody went to the university. All of this began to change with
the 1930-1934 birth cohort — the leader of the fertility boom studied here —
as the lowest levels of education were nearly halved over ∼20 years, primary
education increased by 50 per cent and secondary and university degrees
more than doubled. These cohorts correspond to women who educated
between ∼1945 and 1965. While Latin America lags behind European
nations and especially the United States, advances during the period were
noteworthy and continue to this day.
Education has a strong and expected effect on fertility. The negative
correlation between education and women’s total fertility has become a sort
of constant in demographic research, with numerous examples constituting
solid findings in the field10. In Figure 6, where the number of CEB by
educational attainment and birth cohort is shown, the effect is unmistakable.
9 Detailed figures on educational attainment by birth cohort and country are available directly
from the authors upon request.
10 For developing countries, see Jain (1981), Cleland and Rodríguez (1988), Cochrane (1983),
Entwistle and Mason (1985), Weinberger (1987), Jejeebhoy (1995), Castro (1995), Drèze and Murthi
(2001) and Boongarts (2003).
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Highest levels of fertility are found among the least educated women. At
higher levels of education, fertility decreases and is lowest among university
educated women. Equally as important for the purposes of this paper is the
fact that all educational levels appear to participate in the fertility boom
studied here as well as in the early stages of the baby bust that followed, thus
suggesting that these are general fertility trends affecting all levels of society.
After the 1935-1939 birth cohort, total fertility on the continent tends to be
closer to that of more highly educated women suggesting that structural
increases in education were a key part of this period of declining fertility.
In order to refine the analysis of the relationship between education and
fertility further, we have undertaken a straightforward algebraic decomposition
of the data presented earlier11. The basic idea behind this decomposition is to
differentiate changes in fertility into two components: fertility change that
can be attributed to changes in the educational structure of any given society
and changes that are related specifically to the reproductive behaviour of any
FIGURE 5
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11 The decompositions follow the technique («components of a difference between two rates»
by means of «standardization with interactions allocated equally to the variables involved»)
proposed by Kitagawa (1955 and 1964) and applied, for instance, by Gibson (1976).
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given level of education. Two decompositions have been carried out for each
country included in our sample, one corresponding to the period of fertility
growth and the other to the initial period of fertility decline (Figures 7A and 7B).
With the sole exception of Panama, changing educational structures tended to
depress fertility during the fertility boom period in Latin America (panel A).
Despite this, women of every country, independent of their educational
attainment, ended up contributing to increasing fertility during this period.
In other words, in Latin America the fertility boom took place despite the
pressure downwards on fertility exerted by educational change. On the other
hand, during the initial phase of fertility decline shown in panel B of this
same figure, structural change in education as well as women of all educa-
tional strata participated in the downward trend of fertility.
Fertility and improving survivorship
Throughout this paper, our entire assessment of the fertility boom has been
based on a straightforward demographic indicator like CEB. If, however, our
FIGURE 6
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goal is to analyse the impact of the boom on society, other indicators may be
preferable. This is especially the case with countries from the developing
world that continued to be affected by high levels of mortality during the early
stages of life. There, the impact of increases in fertility would be multiplied if
the scale of mortality changed over the period under analysis, as indeed it did.
In developing countries where the demographic transition was just getting
underway, the role of mortality was likely greater than it would have been in
the developed world where mortality was already at relatively low levels during
this period. In most of the countries included in our sample (the exception is
Argentina), censuses include a question regarding the number of surviving
offspring that can be used to approximate the evolution of mortality. It is
important to remember that this indicator does not refer strictly speaking to
mortality in infancy but rather to survival at the date of the census. This means
that older women will always tend to have fewer surviving offspring than
younger ones, though the differences on this count should be relatively small
FIGURE 7A
A DECOMPOSITION OF THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL
STRUCTURES AND OF FERTILITY BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS ON CHANGES IN
THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN. COHORTS PARTICIPATING IN THE
FERTILITY BOOM.
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
AR
GE
NT
INA
=
+0
.37 BO
LIV
IA
=
+0
.15 BR
AZ
IL
=
+0
.02 CH
ILE
=
+0
.41
CO
ST
A R
ICA
=
+1
.11 ME
XIC
O
=
+0
.70
NIC
AR
AG
UA
=
+0
.92 PA
NA
MA
=
+0
.88
UR
UG
UA
Y
=
+0
.26
VE
NE
ZU
EL
A
=
0.6
5
Educational Composition Less than Primary Primary
Secondary University
Source: IPUMS-I.
DAVID REHER/MIGUEL REQUENA
because in the early stages of the demographic transition most mortality and
most mortality change were concentrated in the initial stages of life. This
approach should yield a relatively robust though approximate indicator of the
role of survivorship for the mid-century fertility boom.
Figure 8 shows the evolution of the percentage of surviving offspring at
the census date in nine different nations and provides a glance at the mor-
tality transition in this part of the world. For cohorts born during the early
years of the 20th century wide disparities exist in mortality, with some
countries showing levels that can be considered typical of pre-transitional
mortality regimes in the West with life expectancy at birth (e0) between
30 and 40, others with somewhat more benign mortality regimes and one
(Uruguay) with relatively low mortality throughout the entire period. More
important for this paper is the fact that everywhere there was a dramatic
increase in survivorship over time in the countries included in this sample
FIGURE 7B
A DECOMPOSITION OF THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN EDUCATIONAL
STRUCTURES AND OF FERTILITY BY EDUCATIONAL STATUS ON CHANGES IN
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that cannot be attributed solely to the different ages of women on the census.
There are indications of a true revolution in health during this period.
Improvements in health during the central decades of the 20th century is not
surprising, though data on developing countries is often difficult to find.
Over time the differences between the number of CEB and the number of
surviving children tends to decrease. If both variables are plotted on the same
graph, this process of convergence is unmistakable (Figure 9). The only
outlier of the nine nations included in the figure is Uruguay mostly because
mortality was already at relatively low levels at the outset of the 20th century.
Implicit in this relationship is the fact that the intensity of the fertility boom
would be much greater if our estimates were based on net family size rather
than on the number of CEB.
This can be seen from a different perspective in Figure 10 where the per
cent increase in fertility with respect to the benchmark cohort for these
cohorts is seen together with the per cent increase in net fertility for the same
cohorts. See from this perspective, the relative contribution of each variable
to the mid-century boom in net fertility can be seen. For comparison’s sake,
the dashed line represents the increase in net fertility with respect to the
benchmark cohort and the solid line the increase in CEB for the same cohort.
The area beneath the solid line would be increases attributable strictly to
FIGURE 8
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fertility and the area between the solid and the dashed lines the part corre-
sponding to health improvements. In most countries, increases in survivor-
ship are even more important for net fertility than those due to fertility
change itself. The net effect of both variables places the Latin American
fertility/health boom on a level only slightly below that of the strongest baby
booms in the developed world (the United States, for example) and well
above the impact of the boom in many other developed countries (Reher and
Requena 2014)12. This result has important implications for the long-term
FIGURE 9
CHILDREN EVER BORN (WOMEN WITH 1+ CHILDREN) AND THE NUMBER OF
SURVIVING OFFSPRING BY BIRTH COHORT
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12 In these countries, health improvements would have had only a marginal effect on net
reproduction because mortality was already at very low levels. This variable, however, is not
available in most censuses from the developed world carried out during the latter years of the
twentieth century.
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economic and social consequences of the fertility boom in Latin America
because it means that the actual number of offspring— the net family size—
increased far beyond what is suggested solely by increases in cohort fertility.
The key element behind the population explosion of the developing world
was a unique combination of increasing fertility coupled with dramatic
improvements in child health.
Another important facet of the complex interaction between mortality
and fertility in these countries is the potential impact for reproduction of
FIGURE 10
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improving survivorship among adults. In particular, the rapid decline in
mortality in Latin America after 1930s brought about an increase in the
number of years women spent in marital unions, that is, of time women were
exposed to risk of motherhood. In the absence of effective contraception,
longer marital unions can be expected to increase cohort fertility (Arriaga
1970)13. The demographic implications of this aspect of changing survivor-
ship could have been substantial in the developing world, although probably
tended to be less important, at least for net reproduction (surviving children),
than improvements in childhood survival.
DISCUSSION
This paper enables us to answer some of the research issues stated earlier
but leaves many intriguing and significant issues unanswered that promise to
command the attention of future research on the subject. The most impor-
tant conclusion is that there was indeed a fertility boom in Latin America
similar to the one seen in many developed countries and in a limited number
of developing countries as well. The intensity of this increase in fertility is
similar to that holding in the West. Despite some notable exceptions, most
of the region participated in this fertility shift with certain common
characteristics. Highest fertility levels were reached among cohorts born
1925-1940, though increases are visible earlier starting from the low levels of
fertility among cohorts born 1910-1919. The boom came to a crashing end
among women born in the 1940s or early 1950s.
The outliers in this pattern are often difficult to explain. Argentina and
Uruguay participated in the historic fertility transition and properly belong
to the set of countries considered ‘pioneers’ of the demographic transition
(Reher 2004). Their demographic system bears little resemblance to that of
the rest of the region during the period under analysis. Despite this, it is
noteworthy that the patterns followed by these two nations are unlike to that
of most developed nations that experienced a baby boom of their own. With
Brazil, where fertility remained largely unchanged before and during the
boom period, there is no ready explanation. It should be remembered,
however, that even in the developed world the baby boom was far from a
uniform phenomenon. In some countries, there were strong increases in
fertility, in others fertility increase was delayed and muted at best and in
13 Making use of data from Mexican and Costa Rican life tables for approximately similar dates
(1920-1930 and 1960-1970 for Mexico, 1920 and 1950 for Costa Rica) the increases in male life
expectancy between 20 and 50 years of age were substantial (4.3 years in Mexico and 5.1 years in
Costa Rica). Since this analysis is based exclusively on women having completed their reproductive
period, the changes in male adult mortality indicate that the duration of unions in the absence of
divorce experienced dramatic increases between the period prior to the fertility boom and the peak
boom years. See Zavala de Cosío (1993, p. 29, 84) and Pérez Brignoli (2010, anexo IV). Recent data
from Latin America Mortality Database (Palloni et al. 2014) confirm these findings.
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others there was no boom at all. In the developed world, the baby boom was
a widespread but not a universal process. In Latin America much the same
appears to be the case.
In order to present a streamlined view of this, Figure 11 shows the inci-
dence rate ratios (IRR) by birth cohort estimated from a Poisson regression
model on the variable «Children Ever Born». IRRs are adjusted by habitat,
marital status, educational level, cohort and country, and offer a synthetic
regional perspective14. Controlling for these independent variables, the inter-
cohort change in the IRRs draws very clearly the double phase of the boom
and bust fertility cycle in the selected Latin American countries. These ratios
summarise in a straightforward and elegant way the pattern of change in
fertility in this world region during the period, showing the boom and bust
cycle clearly, with an initial trend change commencing among cohorts born
during the 1910s, peaking for those born in the 1930s and initiating a long
FIGURE 11
FERTILITY SHIFTS IN LATIN AMERICA. ADJUSTED INCIDENCE RATE RATIOS
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14 The full model can be seen in Table A1. Uruguay and Nicaragua are excluded from this model
because they lack the variable for habitat.
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and precipitous decline for those born in the 1940s. It is a cycle that shows
evident similarities to those found in the developed world during the baby
boom.
The overall shift downward in fertility can be linked to the availability of
widespread and inexpensive contraception, and the differences in timing are
linked to the distribution of contraceptives in different countries. In this
sense, the timing in the decline of fertility in these Latin American nations,
with Costa Rica and Chile leading and Nicaragua, Panama and Bolivia lagging
behind, may well be an indication of the timing of the spread of contraception
in different countries. Beyond the specifics of individual nations, the most
noteworthy aspect of the results presented here are precisely the similarities
in timing both of the fertility boom and the subsequent start of the
fertility bust.
The intensity of the fertility boom in Latin America was highest in Costa
Rica, followed by Panama, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Mexico in that order.
It is impossible for us to estimate with a reasonable degree of accuracy the
intensity of the boom in Bolivia where no realistic benchmark date is
available and, as stated earlier, there was no boom in Argentina, Brazil or
Uruguay. This notwithstanding, fertility in these nations increased by
between 9 and 20 per cent, slightly lower than increases in some developed
countries like the United States, Austria or France (20-40 per cent), higher
than in others (2-5 per cent in Spain and Hungary) and more or less on a par
with increases in a small sample of developing countries (Turkey, Morocco,
China) (Reher and Requena 2014).
The results presented here have added further evidence to the fact that
a fundamental, even universal characteristic of this period of increasing
fertility was an important decline in childlessness. In the Latin American
countries shown here, this decline ranged from less than 4 per cent in Bolivia
to as high as 15 per cent in countries like Uruguay. Everywhere, however,
it declined. Declines in developed nations appear to have been slightly
stronger while in other developing nations levels are similar to those seen in
Latin America (van Bavel and Reher 2013; Reher and Requena 2014). The
universal nature of these declines can be explained by improvements in
maternal health and nutritional status, a truly worldwide phenomenon.
Increasing nuptiality also plays a role, though this effect is only visible in
countries where nuptiality tended to be delayed and muted than where it
tended to be widespread and early.
At higher parities, the most visible result of this study is the proof pre-
sented of an increase in higher order births among Latin American women,
visible both in distributions of final parities and in the parity progression
ratios at higher parities. These increases are only modest in developing
nations mostly because fertility was already at high levels before the fertility
boom. In certain developed nations, this was not the case because fertility
had already reached much lower levels by the 1930s. On this point, it is
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impossible to discount the fact that couples wanted and obtained larger
families during the period. The role of imperfect contraception cannot be
discounted either, though plausibly its role was less important. With the end
of the fertility boom, the ideal of the 4+ children family weakened rapidly and
by the end of the period under study was well on its way to disappearing as
the modal family size.
During this fertility boom, there was an increasing uniformity in the
reproductive behaviour of women. This same result was found years ago in
the United States by Norman Ryder (1986) and recently has been brought to
light in a comparative paper on the fertility boom in developed and in some
developing countries (Reher and Requena 2014). This uniformity of beha-
viour tended to concentrate on the two-child family in the developed world
and on the 4+ child family in the developing world. Even so, increasingly
uniform behaviour may suggest the existence of certain common ideals
regarding family size in different societies. If so, this result would help
substantiate the idea that during the fertility boom people actually wanted
larger families, much as they wanted much smaller ones afterwards. The
results shown here for Latin America pose this same intriguing question for
the region and possibly for others as well.
The 20th century was a period of enormous advances in educational
attainment. This started in the developed world, especially in Northern
Europe and in the English-speaking non-European world, but ended up
affecting the entire world. In the Latin American countries studied here, at
the outset of the century levels of adult female education were alarmingly
low, well-below the lowest levels found in Europe. Yet as the century pro-
gressed, especially starting with women born in the 1930s, educational levels
began a prolonged and thorough change. It was the sign of the times and
increasing education continues to be considered one of the hallmarks of social
modernisation forces everywhere. In this study, educational levels have been
shown to have a substantial impact on reproductive behaviour with women of
higher educational attainment invariably exhibiting lower fertility, and the less
educated showing higher fertility, a result similar to the one found in Reher
and Requena (2014). During the period of the fertility boom, it has been shown
that while changes in the general structure of education tended to depress
fertility, all social and educational groups participated in higher fertility. Yet
when the fertility bust followed the boom, both structural change and all
educational groups contributed to the decline. This suggests that these large
fertility swings (boom, bust) responded to ideas and values shared by all social
groups, irrespective of their levels of education.
At the same time, as the educational revolution underway in mid-century
Latin America, enormous strides in the fight against infant and child mor-
tality and infectious disease were being made. This process was especially
strong in countries like Costa Rica, Venezuela and Chile but can be seen
throughout the region. This change had powerful implications for family size
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because it increased the numbers of surviving children enormously. When
our admittedly approximate census-based indicator of the number surviving
offspring is used, it turns out that the intensity of the fertility boom nearly
doubles in the region and even in countries like Brazil with no apparent
fertility spurt there is a marked increase in the number of surviving offspring.
Our estimate, reflecting both fertility changes and improving mortality,
nearly doubles the overall intensity of this period of increased fertility plus
increased survivorship, nearing the levels reached by the developed countries
where the baby boom had been strongest. Mortality change also had impli-
cations for reproduction by means of improved adult survivorship leading to
longer married lives for adults, facilitating reproduction in the absence of
divorce and in contexts of imperfect fertility control. This second effect may
have been smaller for completed family size (net reproduction) than the one
influencing surviving children, though it represents a significant and often
overlooked contribution of adult mortality change to fertility during the
boom period that has often been neglected in the literature despite the fact
that it constitutes a key part of the population explosion taking place in the
developing world at this time. Managing this growth in population was
no small task for these countries. Its initial consequence was breakneck
population growth in the region, intense migration and increasing levels of
poverty. Only now is the region beginning to emerge from this scenario,
thanks largely to the enormous reduction in fertility and in family size whose
beginnings are visible in the data presented here.
FURTHER THOUGHTS
This paper has presented strong evidence from a large sample of coun-
tries in Latin America that a fertility boom took place in the region during
the central decades of the 20th century, concretely among women born
between 1925 and 1945. Not every country in the region participated in this,
but in seven out of the ten countries included here the spurt is unquestion-
able. Considering the heterogeneity that characterised the baby boom in the
developed world, the disparities in Latin America should come as no sur-
prise. The basic timing of the boom mirrored closely the cycle taking place in
the developed world, as did many of its component parts. Despite some
differences between both worlds, the overall impression is that they are
different parts of a great mid-century change in fertility. At this stage, it is
only possible to make this statement with a degree of confidence for the
developed world and for Latin America. In the future, our goal is to include
more countries from other parts of the world. In so doing, we may be able to
piece together the basic outline of a world history of fertility during the
central decades of the 20th century. Whether or not there is a real world
pattern in fertility remains unclear. Until this sample is increased to include
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more countries from Asia and from Africa, speaking of world fertility patterns
must remain a matter of speculation.
These strides in our understanding of past fertility patterns outside of the
developed world have been made, thanks to a massive data set bringing
together micro-census data for many countries and censuses corresponding
to the final years of the 20th century. These data are not without problems
and individual censuses were carefully vetted to ascertain their reliability and
quality. In Latin America, a number of countries met the criteria outlined in
this paper and in Reher and Requena (2014) but others have not. This is not
to say that the data included here are not without problems, yet the reality
they reveal is similar to that found in censuses from developed countries
and coincides with other sources based on vital statistics, where available.
It would have been ideal to use only vital statistics for this paper, much as
van Bavel and Reher (2013) did in their paper on the baby boom, but these
statistics are simply not available or are not reliable for much of the devel-
oping world. The micro census data and the IPUMS-I database have enabled
us to unlock a large parcel of Latin American population history that until
now was largely unknown. Lack of adequate data is no longer a reason to
overlook the history of fertility during the central decades of the 20th century.
Despite the similarities, in the end we are hesitant to call the mid-century
fertility boom a real baby boom. The term ‘baby boom’ was tailored to the
developed world specifically and referred to the sharp rise in fertility taking
place around the time of the war or afterwards. Since starting levels were
relatively low, it refers to a real trend change taking place at a fairly advanced
stage of the demographic transition. In the developing world, this was not the
case, as the rise in fertility took place before the demographic transition
when starting levels of fertility were still very high. The main distinguishing
factor here is the timing of the demographic transition.
The extent to which this fertility shift was common to all, to most or to
some of the developing world remains to be seen, but demographers and
historical demographers can no longer overlook this possibility. Until now,
explanations for this great cycle have been lacking. Identifying this fertility
cycle in Latin America is a step in the right direction. Enlarging the sample of
developing countries and proposing a plausible explanatory framework that
will help us understand it better are major challenges for future research
(Table A1).
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Selected Latin American countries
CEB Coefficient SE z P IRR
Constant 0.651 *** 0.004 164.90 0.000
Urban-Rural
Status
Urban −0.196 *** 0.0006 −306.06 0.000 0.82
Rural
Marital Status
Widow 1.067 *** 0.002 689.61 0.000 2.91
Separated/
divorced
1.012 *** 0.002 620.23 0.000 2.75
Married 1.075 *** 0.001 731.26 0.000 2.93
Single . .
Education
University −0.766 *** 0.002 −422.09 0.000 0.46
Secondary −0.620 *** 0.001 −618.06 0.000 0.54
Primary −0.342 *** 0.001 −508.15 0.000 0.71
Less than
Primary
Cohort
1955-1959 −0.245 *** 0.004 −66.83 0.000 0.78
1950-1954 −0.175 *** 0.004 −47.71 0.000 0.84
1945-1949 −0.097 *** 0.004 −26.44 0.000 0.91
1940-1944 −0.016 *** 0.004 −4.27 0.000 0.98
1935-1939 0.035 *** 0.004 9.56 0.000 1.04
1930-1934 0.044 *** 0.004 11.98 0.000 1.04
1925-1929 0.029 *** 0.004 7.77 0.000 1.03
1920-1924 0.008 * 0.004 2.09 0.037 1.01
1915-1919 −0.012 ** 0.004 −3.12 0.002 0.99
1910-1914 −0.020 *** 0.004 −4.85 0.000 0.98
1905-1909
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TABLE A1 (Cont. )
CEB Coefficient SE z P IRR
Country
Venezuela 0.414 *** 0.001 350.36 0.000 1.51
Panama 0.288 *** 0.003 107.17 0.000 1.33
Mexico 0.383 *** 0.001 434.05 0.000 1.47
Costa Rica 0.329 *** 0.002 140.98 0.000 1.39
Chile 0.126 *** 0.001 88.65 0.000 1.13
Brazil 0.137 *** 0.001 152.57 0.000 1.15
Bolivia 0.427 *** 0.002 251.12 0.000 1.53
Argentina
Number of observations = 3,612,363
LR χ2 (24) = 2,762,078,394
Prob> χ2 = 0.000
Log likelihood =−8,589,345
Notes: IRR: incidence rate ratios; CEB, children ever born.
Poisson regression model on CEB.
*P< 0.05; **P< 0.01; ***P<0.001 (Nicaragua and Uruguay excluded: not Urban/Rural Status).
Source: IPUMS-I.
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